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Abstract. In this essay I identify and develop an alternative to pluralism which is overlooked 
in contemporary debate in philosophy of religion and in theology. According to this view, 
some but not all of the great world religions are equally correct, that is to say, they are 
just as successful when it comes to tracking the truth and providing a path to salvation. 
This alternative is not haunted by the same difficulty as pluralism, namely the problem of 
emptiness. It is therefore more rational at least for many Muslims, but probably also for 
many Christians and Jews, to embrace it rather than to embrace pluralism. Whether it is 
also to be preferred over exclusivism and inclusivism is a topic which I will not address 
in this essay.
The classic attempt to deal with religious diversity within contemporary 
philosophy of religion is to defend exclusivism, inclusivism or pluralism. 
In this essay I shall try to show that there is an alternative which is 
overlooked.1 It is an alternative which is not haunted by the same problem 
as pluralism (which I shall, due to limitation of space, take to include 
primarily John Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis) and it is therefore more 
rational at least for many Muslims, but probably also for many Christians 
and Jews, to embrace it rather than to embrace pluralism. Whether it is 
to be preferred over exclusivism and inclusivism as well is beyond the 
scope of this essay to answer.
I shall start by suggesting a typology which lists the options that reli-
gious believers face in a situation of religious diversity. I shall then identify 
an objection against pluralism, the problem of emptiness, which undermines 
1 Although I probably did not convince Peter Byrne, I would like to express my thanks 
to him for his critical and constructive comments on the essay. I gratefully acknowledge 
financial support from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond which made the writing of this essay 
possible.
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the view. It is the main objective of this essay to point out that there is an 
alternative which typically is not considered in the philosophical and theo-
logical debate—an alternative which can successfully handle this objection.
THE ALTERNATIVES
It is helpful to start by identifying the actual options we have in a situation 
of religious diversity. If we look at the previous research in the area, it looks 
as if religious believers have the following choices. We could as a result 
of an encounter with other religions choose:
to abandon our religion and replace it with one of these other (1) 
religions (the conversion alternative),
to abandon our religion and decide not to have any religion at all (2) 
(the naturalistic alternative),
to continue to hold on to our religion and believe that only it is (3) 
correct (the-only-one-is-right alternative),
to continue to hold on to our religion and believe that it is more cor-(4) 
rect than these other religions (the one-is-more-right alternative),
to continue to hold on to our religion and believe that the great (5) 
world religions are equally correct (the many-are-equally-right 
alternative),
to continue to hold on to our religion and believe that all religions (6) 
of the world are equally correct (the all-are-equally-right alterna-
tive), or
to decide not to take a stand on which of these alternatives 1 to 6 (7) 
we should embrace (the agnostic alternative).
If I as a Christian encounter Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism or any other 
great world religion, I could choose to convert to one of them, say Islam. 
I then consider Islam to be the religion that I actually should embrace and 
act accordingly. This is alternative 1. Or perhaps I am overwhelmed by the 
differences that seem to exist between the religions of the world and draw 
the conclusion that neither Christianity nor any other religion is correct, 
and therefore no religion is worth being a practitioner of. This is the 
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second option we can choose in a situation of religious diversity. A third 
alternative is that despite these encounters I continue to be a Christian 
and believe that my own religion is after all the only one which is correct 
and everyone should therefore strive to become a Christian. Alternative 
3 is often called exclusivism. Yet there is a possibility, alternative 4, that 
I think that the best thing to do is to remain a Christian but believe that 
it is not completely wrong or incorrect to be a Muslim or a member of 
some of the other world religions.
Alternative 5 is that I reach the conclusion that it will do just as well—
it is equally correct—to be either a Christian or a Muslim or a member 
of any of the other great world religions. This is religious pluralism or 
at least the view of which John Hick is perhaps the most well-known 
defender.2 He defines it as “the name that has been given to the idea 
that the great world religions are different human responses to the same 
ultimate transcendent reality.”3 But sometimes pluralism is understood 
more in terms of alternative 6, which would mean that I continue to hold 
on to my religion but believe that not merely the great world religions 
but all religions of the world are equally correct. Gary Kessler writes that 
“according to pluralism, all religions are valid paths to salvation.”4 Paul 
Griffiths claims that “an upshot of all forms of pluralism with respect 
to salvation is that no benefit, so far as the attainment of salvation is 
concerned, is provided by belonging to one religious form of life rather 
than another.”5 Whether or not we call both of these views “pluralism,” 
the distinction between the many-are-equally-right view and the all-
are-equally-right view is important because the latter view seems quite 
difficult to defend and Hick’s pluralism should not be confused with it. 
Anthony F.C. Wallace estimates that humans have produced 100 000 
religions.6 Perhaps he exaggerated a bit, but still, how could all of the 
2 John Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, eds., 
A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
3 John Hick, The Fifth Dimension: an Exploration of the Spiritual Realm, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 77.
4 Gary E. Kessler, ed. Philosophy of Religion, Belmont, CA. Wadsworth, 1999, p. 529.
5 Paul J. Griffith, Problems of Religious Diversity, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, p. 142.
6 Anthony F. C. Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View, New York: Random 
House, 1966, p. 3.
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religions which have existed on earth possibly be equally right? What 
a convincing argument for that conclusion would look like is hard even to 
imagine. Hick’s claim is anyhow more restricted. It is that the great world 
religions are ways of salvation. They are equally successful in transforming 
human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.7 He is 
therefore an advocate of the many-are-equally-right view.
A last possibility, alternative 7, is that we postpone our decision about 
which of the six alternatives we should choose, and think that this is the 
most rational thing for us to do in the circumstances in which we find 
ourselves. This is the agnostic view.
There are, however, some reasons that show fairly conclusively why 
some of these options can be rejected more or less immediately.
Suppose that I as a Christian, according to alternative 1, choose to 
convert to Islam and become a Muslim. After my conversion I still have 
to make up my mind whether my new religion is the only correct one or 
whether it is merely more correct than Christianity. But this means that 
the conversion alternative becomes, in the next stage, either alternative 3 
or alternative 4. Alternative 2 is immediately ruled out. Alternative 6 is 
also ruled out because I could not at the same time convert to Islam and 
reject taking a stand on whether Islam rather than Christianity is to be 
preferred. Alternative 6 could become a possibility if I came into contact 
with yet another religion. Moreover, there is no point after the conversion 
in accepting alternative 5 or 6. Because why should I as a Christian convert 
to Islam if both should be considered to be equally correct?
What should we say about alternative 2? I call it the naturalistic 
alternative since it means that I, when encountering other religions such 
as Islam, should stop being a religious believer and start to believe that 
both Christianity and Islam and all other religions are incorrect and 
therefore not worthy of my commitment. How should we evaluate this 
alternative? Is it a reasonable position to take as a result of an encounter 
with other religions? The answer is no if we merely focus on the fact that 
there is a diversity of religions. I think it is fairly easy to see why if we 
raise the same kind of question in another context. Suppose I believe 
that a particular political party is the best one. It turns out however that 
7 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, Yale: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 240.
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there are a lot of people who think that parties other than my party are 
best. Should this give me a good reason not merely to abandon my own 
party but actually to start believing that no party whatsoever is worthy 
of my commitment? If I give an affirmative answer, I am immediately in 
a situation similar to the one I was in before, because when it comes to 
this new standpoint (that one should not be a member of any political 
party at all) there are also a lot of people who disagree with me. Therefore 
I should also abandon this view. In other words, we end up in a vicious 
circle that we cannot get out of. Therefore there must exist a reason other 
than merely the fact that people adhere to different religions or different 
political parties, for it to be rational for me as a religious believer or 
a member of a political party to draw the conclusion that no religion or 
political party at all is worthy of my commitment. Religious diversity per 
se does not constitute a good reason to abandon one’s religion and start 
to believe that all religions are incorrect.8
What about alternative 7? The agnostic alternative can be understood 
in at least two different ways. Either I am agnostic about the whole 
spectrum of views or I am agonistic about alternative 3, 4, 5 and 6. In 
either case it is a rational position to take, I think, at least sometimes. Not 
surprisingly, except perhaps for alternative 7, the discussion in philosophy 
of religion has focused on exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, that 
is alternative 3, 4 and 5. I shall claim, however, that there is at least one 
important alternative missing from this debate, which for many Muslims 
in particular, but also for practitioners of other religions, constitutes a bet-
ter alternative than pluralism.
So far I have not said anything explicitly about a very important ques-
tion, namely, concerning what, exactly, it is that religions are supposed to 
be correct. What do I mean by the term “correct” in the list of alternatives? 
There are certain obvious candidates and I shall also pick two of these 
but I think it is often wise to leave it open to people, depending on 
which religion they endorse and how they understand their religion to 
fill out for themselves what “correct” actually means. For certain religious 
8 This parallel also shows that the naturalistic alternative, in a similar way to the 
conversion alternative, actually is a version of either alternative 3 or 4, it is just that “the 
court of the game” has, so to speak, been expanded. You can see this if in the scheme you 
replace the word “religion” with “worldview.”
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believers it might be the rituals, for others it might be ethical norms or 
moral behaviour or it might be salvation, and for others still it might be 
truth, and so on. There are religious people who hold non-cognitive or 
non-propositional views of religion and there are those who hold cognitive 
or propositional views of religion. The list of alternatives is meant to be 
neutral in regard to this choice. However, in contemporary philosophy 
of religion the focus has been on two of these, namely truth or cognitive 
success and salvation or soteriological success so for instance alternative 3 
could be stated in two different ways:9
(3´) After an encounter with religions other than our own, we still 
continue to hold on to our religion and believe that only it contains 
true religious beliefs.
(3´´) After an encounter with other religions, we still continue to hold 
on to our religion and believe that only this religion’s path to salvation 
is efficient and actually leads to salvation.
The other alternatives could be explicated in these two different ways as 
well, either in terms of cognitive or soteriological success. For my purpose 
in this essay it is not of great importance, but it follows of course that these 
answers could be combined in different ways. So although (3´) and
(4´) After an encounter with other religions, we still continue to hold 
on to our religion and believe that these other religions contain true 
religious beliefs but that our religion contains a larger number of 
them.
are incompatible options, one could embrace (3´´) and (4´), and so on.
9 An analogy might explain the difference between the two: one might have found 
a medicine that works, that cures people from a disease without one actually knowing 
much at all about the disease (that would be the equivalence of soteriological success), or 
one might know many true things about the disease but still lack a medicine that cures 
people (cognitive success), or one might of course have been successful in both of these 
regards. 
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My claims will be that whether we explicate the alternatives in 
terms of truth or salvation, there (a) is a missing alternative and it (b) is 
more reasonable, at least for many Muslims, but probably also for many 
Christians and Jews, to embrace it rather than to embrace pluralism.
THE PROBLEM WITH  
THE MANY-ARE-EQUALLY-RIGHT VIEW
A problem many, if not all, versions of pluralism seem to have is that of 
locating a common referential success that all religions covered by the view 
are supposed to achieve. So something like what I shall call the “problem 
of emptiness” might obtain for all of them. I do not have the space here 
to develop such a case but will, as I stated at the beginning of the essay, 
limit my critical remarks to Hick’s pluralism.
Hick maintains that the most rational thing for religious believers to 
do in a situation of religious diversity is to continue to believe that the 
infinite Real exists (which is the source of our religious experiences) but 
to start to believe that “the infinite Real, in itself beyond the scope of 
other than purely formal concepts, is differently conceived, experienced 
and responded to by people in at least the great religious traditions of the 
world.”10 These traditions include for instance Judaism, Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism and Hinduism. We should believe that they are all equally 
soteriologically and epistemically successful. Any of them tracks the truth 
and offers a valid path to salvation/liberation as well as any other.
A number of problems connected to Hick’s interesting proposal have 
been discussed in recent years. However, the most severe difficulty, in 
my view, is the problem of emptiness.11 The great world religions seem 
to make conflicting claims about God, the Real or ultimate reality. For 
some believers the infinite Real is personal, loving, powerful and the 
10 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 14.
11 It has been developed in slightly different ways by, for instance, Keith Yandell, 
Philosophy of Religion, London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 65-79, Philip L. Quinn, “Towards 
Thinner Theologies”, Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challenge 
of Religious Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 226-242, and Alvin 
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 43-63.
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creator of the world. For others the infinite Real is non-dual, impersonal, 
transcending the illusory world in which we live and think, and so on. 
How could all of the great world religions be equally true and offer equally 
valid paths to salvation if this is the case? Hick’s well-know solution to 
this problem is to appeal to Kant’s distinction between reality in itself 
or un sich (noumenal reality) and reality for us or für uns (phenomenal 
reality). Just as my belief that the car over there appears to me to be blue 
and your belief that it seems to you to be black do not contradict each 
other since both can be true (because that is the way the car appears to 
us) so, similarly, the beliefs of the great world traditions do not contradict 
each other. The different religious understandings of the Real in terms of 
Jahve, the Trinity, Allah, Brahman, Shiva or Tao contradict each other only 
if the believers claim that the way the Real appears and is experienced 
by them corresponds to the Real as it is in itself, but Hick suggest that 
believers should not make such claims.
Suppose I accept Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis and start to maintain 
that my belief in God as personal, just and compassion is true only in the 
sense that this is the way that the Real appears to and is experienced by 
me, but it does not say anything at all about how the Real or God is in 
itself. But how could I then know or be rationally entitled to believe that 
I and all the other believers of the great world religions experience and 
talk about the same thing or try to establish a relationship to or insights 
about the same greatness?
Let us again go back to the analogy to identify the problem. How 
do you and I know that we are talking about the same thing when 
I say that the car appears to me to be blue and you say that it appears 
to you to be black? The answer is of course that we also see that it has 
a certain shape; it has tires, doors, windows and so on (and it is against 
this background we can understand our disagreement). Now Hick’s idea 
is that even these impressions should be understood phenomenologically, 
that is, they do not really say anything about how the car is in itself but 
only something about how it appears to us. What we should actually say 
is not merely that the car appears to me to be blue and to you to be black, 
but that it appears to have a certain shape, tires, doors, windows and so 
forth. We do not know anything about how the car is in itself—what it 
should be like if we were not there to observe it. It is a complete mystery. 
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Maybe we could live with this since we agree on what many of these 
properties are, which also make it possible for us to describe and treat 
the object as a car. But our problem is in fact greater than this. It is not 
just the case (if we stick to the analogy) that you and I do not agree on 
the colour of the car but where I see window, you see mirrors, where 
you see tires, I see stones. We even have different beliefs about the very 
structure of the object.
Hick’s suggestion is that we should understand our claims about the 
object not as expressing contradictory but contrary properties. What 
characterizes the object is that it does not have any of the substantive 
properties you and I believe it to have, but some other properties that 
none of us know anything about. Our claims are therefore not mutually 
exclusive and they do not contradict each other in this sense. His second 
proposal is that we should not talk about a car anymore (or in the actual 
case, we should not talk about God, Brahman, or Tao anymore) but about 
the “Real.” It is real because you and I agree that it is the object that causes 
our experiences.
But how, then, could we know or be rationally entitled to believe 
that what we originally called a car (and now call the Real) is a car or 
even has anything at all to do with cars, since it could just as well have 
to do with a tree, a mountain, a poster or a house. How could we even 
know that it has to do with one object? It could be many objects. The 
Real itself could be any thing (or at least have any property other than 
those you and I claim characterizes it or on an alternative interpreta-
tion have no substantive properties at all). It is an unknowable and 
unidentifiable X.
Let us now go back to religion again. If, as Hick admits, the ac-
ceptance of the many-are-equally-right view (or pluralism) entails that 
the Real ”cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, conscious or 
unconscious, purposive or nonpurposive, substance or process, good or 
evil, loving or hating” since these are mutually exclusive but not exhaustive 
properties, why should I as a Christian or say you as a Muslim believe 
that this X, what Hick calls the Real, has anything at all to do with our 
religions?12 How could Christians and Muslims be rationally entitled 
12 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 350.
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to believe that their experiences of God as personal, just and compas-
sion have anything in particular to do with this X rather than say their 
experiences of art, food, football, vacationing or car driving? This is the 
problem of emptiness.
Perhaps someone might object and say that what is important is after 
all the transformation that the great world religions cause in peoples’ lives 
and not their experiences and beliefs. These religions start a process of 
transformation in which people go from selfishness and self-centeredness 
to a life that is characterized by love and compassion. For this reason we 
should also expect them to offer equally successful paths to salvation. Here 
the same problem comes back to haunt us again but in a different shape. 
Why should we believe that the paths to the Real have anything to do 
with unselfishness, love and compassion? If the Real cannot be said to 
be one or many, person or thing, conscious or unconscious, purposive or 
nonpurposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving or hating, why 
should we then believe it to be connected to what is good rather than 
what is evil? The answer is that it is not any more connected to the good 
than the evil because it is not in any special way connected to anything 
of which we have a conception. So the conclusion would still be the 
same, namely that an acceptance of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis entails 
that the religious ultimate is emptied of content and that its relation 
to the good life erodes. This gives us a good reason not to embrace the 
many-are-equally-right view, at least in its Hickian version, or, which is 
more to the point, gives philosophers of religion, theologians or religious 
believers who have accepted or advocated Hick’s pluralism a good reason 
to look for an alternative. Is it then possible to formulate a fall back 
position for the pluralist? I believe it is and I shall also claim that it can 
avoid the problem of emptiness.
THE SOME-ARE-EQUALLY-RIGHT VIEW
In a sense it is obvious that religious believers can respond to the content 
of other religions in different ways, but it is something which seems 
to have been forgotten in the discussion about exclusivism, inclusivism, 
and pluralism in philosophy of religion or in theology for that matter. 
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The idea of Hick and other pluralists’ is that we should believe that all 
the great religions of the world are equally successful when it comes to 
tracking the truth and providing a path to salvation.13 But why not believe 
that some but not all of these great world religions are epistemically and 
soteriologically equally successful?
Suppose that you are a Muslim, in that case, it is part of your tradition 
to believe that Jews and Christians are also “People of the Book.” They 
possess their own revealed scriptures and worship the true God. They 
are in this sense privileged in a way that for instance Buddhists and 
Hindus seem not to be. In the Qur’an we can read that “Believers, Jews, 
Christians, and Sabaeans—whoever believes in God and the Last Day 
and does what is right—shall be rewarded by their Lord; they have 
nothing to fear or to regret” (Surah 2:62). In the comment to this Surah 
in the Swedish translation of the Qur’an, Muhammad Asad writes that 
here only three conditions for salvation are listed: to believe truly in 
God, to believe in the Last Day and to live a righteous life.14 Mahmut 
Aydin agrees and claims that the conditions of acceptability to God, are 
“believing in God and the Hereafter, and performing righteousness.”15 His 
conclusion is that “the Qur’an calls all people to follow the ‘Abrahamic 
Religion’ whose essence is to reject all forms of idolatry and to obey 
the will of the Lord of the worlds by submitting to Him.”16 According 
to Sane M. Yagi and A. R. Rasheed there are “numerous verses [like 
Surah 2:62] in the Qur’an which unequivocally define salvation in non-
exclusivist terms and extend it to Jews and Christians.”17 The same kind 
of understanding cannot be found in the Qur’an when it comes to 
polytheists, for instance, because it is a serious sin (shirk) to associate 
partners with God (Surah 4:116).
13 See for instance Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism, London: MacMillan 
Press, 1995. 
14 Koranens budskap, Stockholm: Proprius förlag, 1998, p. 13 n. 50.
15 Mahmut Aydin, “Is There Only One Way to God? A Muslim View,” Studies in 
Interreligious Dialogue, 10 (2000), p. 152.
16 Aydin, “Is There Only One Way to God? A Muslim View,” p. 153
17 Yagi, Sane M. and A.R. Rasheed, “Exclusivism in the Gospels and the Qur’an,” 
Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 7 (1997), p. 10
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So it seems to be quite possible for Muslims to believe that Christianity, 
Islam, and Judaism are equally right at least in the sense that they all pro-
vide an equally valid path to salvation, while deny that this is the case with 
respect to the other great world religions. It is not just possible, but even 
much more in line with their Holy Scripture than Hick’s pluralism.
This position, the some-are-equally-right view, could also be extended 
to truth claims. One would then maintain that Christianity and Judaism 
contain on the whole as many true beliefs as Islam does. None of these 
three world religions does any better epistemically speaking than the 
others; although they all do better in this regard than the rest of the great 
religions of the world.
A possible objection is of course that I have wrongly interpreted 
my Islamic sources, at least when it comes to the second point about 
equal cognitive success. It seems quite clear from the quotations given 
that Aydin, Yagi and Rasheed maintain that not only Islam but also the 
Religions of the Book, Judaism and Christianity, provide a valid path to 
salvation. However, salvific effectiveness and cognitive success are two 
different things, and it is doubtful that they would accept also the latter. 
This may be true, but it is hard to determine given the texts I have referred 
to. Nevertheless it is beside the point, because all I am saying here is that 
it is possible to extend the some-are-equally-right view in such a way that 
it also includes cognitive success and that it is more likely that Muslims 
would accept that view than pluralism.
The some-are-equally-right view should then be distinguished from 
Hick’s pluralism. It could of course also be defended by advocates of 
any other religion, but the way in which the view would be expressed 
and justified would probably be different. We have identified a missing 
alternative, which means that we could as a result of an encounter with 
other religions also choose:
to continue to hold on to our religion and believe that some of the (8) 
great world religions are equally correct (the some-are-equally-right 
alternative).
Could the some-are-equally-right view deal with the problem of empti-
ness better than the all-are-equally-right view? I think the answer is “yes” 
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and this is the reason why. What according to Hick characterizes the 
Real in itself is that it does not have any of the different properties which 
advocates of the great religions of the world believe it has. It is neither 
one nor many, person nor thing, conscious nor unconscious, purposive 
nor nonpurposive, substance nor process, good nor evil, loving nor hating, 
just nor unjust, but is characterized by some other properties—properties 
which for human beings are completely unknown and impossible to 
conceptualize. In other words, what creates the problem of emptiness is 
that the Real is experienced by religious people in such radically different 
ways. This together with the idea that the object does not have any of 
these properties but is characterized by some other unknown properties 
creates the problem of emptiness. The Real becomes without content and 
it is not possible to sustain its logical connection to the good life.
But a Christian and a Muslim understanding of God are not that 
different. Many Christians and Muslims agree that there is a God and 
that this God is mighty but also just and compassionate. There seems 
therefore to be no need to make a distinction between a phenomenal 
and a noumenal reality to be able to handle contradicting religious 
beliefs. Instead the advocates of the some-are-equally-right view could 
claim that on those issues where Christianity and Islam contradict each 
other, it is reasonable to believe that sometimes neither of the religions is 
right, sometimes it is one of them and sometimes it is the other one, but 
generally speaking they are equally successful in tracking the truth. They 
would then also maintain that to the extent that Buddhism, Hinduism 
or any other great world religion claims that God is not one but many, 
not a person but a thing, not conscious but unconscious, not purposive 
but nonpurposive, not good but evil, not loving but hating, not just but 
unjust, they are or probably are wrong.
Defenders of the some-are-equally-right view could, just like Hick, 
refer to the negative theology which is part of their religious traditions 
but give it a less radical interpretation. Hick claims that negative theol-
ogy offers support for the idea that the Real is such that we cannot say 
anything about it. Its nature cannot be grasped in human thought and 
language.18 But they can on this point hold the more moderate position 
18 John Hick, “Ineffability,” Religious Studies, 36 (2000), pp. 35-46.
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that God goes beyond our conceptions in the sense that our thoughts 
about God do not fully capture who God is. God is above reason and 
therefore there are things about God that we do not know or even cannot 
know. It also means that some of the things we believe that we know or 
at least are rationally entitled to believe about God could very well be 
wrong or just partly true. But God is not thought to be a complete mystery. 
God has through revelations (such as the Bible or the Qur’an) revealed 
some things about Godself. We have received moral guidelines and some 
knowledge about who God is so that we can obey, serve, and worship 
God in a correct way. The Qur’an states that God in his omnipotence is 
also omnipresent and “close” to every creature (Surah 34:50, 50:16). God is 
compassionate, eternal, just, holy and forgiving without any equals (Surah 
5:98, 59:23). God is self-subsistent, unchanging, the sustainer of the world, 
the Lord of all and his work is prefect. Many Christians would also claim 
that all of these attributes characterizes God.
At the same time many Christians would probably express doubts 
about some of ideas found in the Qur’an, namely that God “leaves in 
error whom He will” (Surah 13:27) and is the one who deceives both the 
good and the bad (Surah 14:4); the one who is responsible for peoples’ 
ignorance (Surah 6:35), idolatry (Surah 16:35-36) and unbelief (Surah 
10:99). One of the ninety-nine beautiful names of God is the “deceiver” 
or “misleader” (al-mudill). Muslims on the other hand might question 
the idea that humans are created in the image of God since there would 
then be something of God beside Himself and the idea that humans have 
a fallen nature—that they are supposed to be exposed to some kind of 
original sin which corrupts their nature.
Advocates of the some-are-equally-right view could take seriously 
these different views of God and human beings better than a pluralist like 
Hick. They do not have to deny these differences or try to explain them 
away (by for instance adding a distinction between a phenomenal and 
a noumenal reality). Advocates of the some-are-equally-right view could 
also maintain that some of their religious beliefs are closer to the truth 
than some of the beliefs which could be found in another religion. What 
they must claim, if they want to avoid their view becoming a version of 
the one-is-more-right view or inclusivism, is that although their religion 
on certain issues might be closer to the truth than the other religion, they 
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are both epistemically speaking equally successful, that is, on the whole 
they both deliver the same amount of true beliefs.
In this essay I have identified an alternative to pluralism which is 
overlooked in contemporary debate in philosophy of religion and in 
theology. According to the some-are-equally-right view, some but not 
all of the great world religions are equally correct, that is to say, they 
are just as successful when it comes to tracking the truth and providing 
a path to salvation. This alternative is not haunted by the same difficulty as 
pluralism or at least Hick’s pluralism, namely the problem of emptiness. It 
is therefore more rational, at least for many Muslims, but probably also for 
many Christians and Jews, to embrace it rather than to embrace pluralism. 
Whether it is also to be preferred over exclusivism and inclusivism is 
a topic which I have not addressed in this essay.19
19 Some of my ideas about exclusivism can be found in “Exclusivism, Tolerance and 
Interreligious Dialogue,” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 16 (2006), pp. 100-114.
